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Mass Shootings and Public Support for Gun Control
BENJAMIN J. NEWMAN AND TODD K. HARTMAN*
The recent spate of mass public shootings in the United States raises important questions about how
these tragic events might impact mass opinion and public policy. Integrating research on focusing events,
contextual effects and perceived threat, this article stipulates that residing near a mass shooting should
increase support for gun control by making the threat of gun violence more salient. Drawing upon
multiple data sources on mass public shootings paired with large-N survey data, it demonstrates that
increased proximity to a mass shooting is associated with heightened public support for stricter gun
control. Importantly, the results show that this effect does not vary by partisanship, but does vary as a
function of salience-related event factors, such as repetition, magnitude and recency. Critically, the core
result is replicated using panel data. Together, these results suggest a process of context-driven policy
feedback between existing gun laws, egregious gun violence and demand for policy change.
Keywords: gun control; gun violence; mass shooting; public opinion; contextual effect
We gather here in memory of twenty beautiful children and six remarkable adults. They lost their
lives in a school that could have been any school; in a quiet town full of good and decent people
that could be any town in America.
—Former President Barack Obama1
On 14 December 2012, a young man opened ﬁre on twenty-eight people at Sandy Hook
Elementary in Newtown, Connecticut, killing twenty school children and six adult staff
members in one of the worst mass public shootings in recent US history. In the weeks that
followed, an intense public debate surrounded the issue of gun violence, covering a wide array
of topics such as the mental health of attackers,2 cultural issues3 and violent video games;4 the
core political issue was restricting access to ﬁrearms. Speaking about the tragedy, former
President Obama reminded Americans that Newtown was not an isolated incident; rather, there
seemed to be ‘an endless series of deadly shootings across the country, almost daily reports of
victims, many of them children, in small towns and big cities all across America’.5 While the
attacks at Sandy Hook and other mass public shootings like those in Aurora, Blacksburg and
Littleton make national headlines, there are countless others that receive considerably less
attention but are just as devastating to affected communities.
* Department of Political Science, School of Public Policy, University of California, Riverside
(email: bnewman@ucr.edu); Shefﬁeld Methods Institute, The University of Shefﬁeld (email: t.k.hartman@
shefﬁeld.ac.uk). We would like to thank Steven Melendez for his help with the data and Figure 1. Data
replication sets are available in Harvard Dataverse at: https://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LL6UTV and an online
appendix is available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000333.
1 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2012/12/16/remarks-president-sandy-hook-interfaith-prayer-vigil.
2 Kellerman 2012.
3 Ghose 2012.
4 Jaslow 2013.
5 Jaslow 2013.
Gun legislation has become a perennial issue in American politics, driven in large measure by the
increased media attention and public interest in gun control laws following mass public shootings.
A predictable feature of the discourse following mass shootings in the United States is the polarized
response by gun rights and gun control activists. On the one hand, powerful gun rights advocates like
the National Riﬂe Association (NRA) claim that these attacks demonstrate the need for more – not less
– access to ﬁrearms in the hands of qualiﬁed professionals. On the heels of the Sandy Hook shootings,
NRA Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre famously said, ‘the only thing that stops a bad guy
with a gun is a good guy with a gun’.6 Second Amendment advocates also point to surges in NRA
membership following mass public shootings as evidence of the public’s support for their cause.7 On
the other hand, grassroots gun control groups like the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence urge
lawmakers to heed the millions of dollars in private donations that poured in after Sandy Hook and
similar events as a signal that public opinion had shifted in their favor.8 Dan Gross, President of the
Brady Campaign, pleaded with Congress to acknowledge the growing ‘disconnect between what the
American public wants on this issue and what [our] elected ofﬁcials are doing about it’.9
When shifting the focus from the responses of elites to the general public, one question of clear
importance is whether public opinion is impacted by instances of profound gun violence. Further,
compared to citizens living hundreds or even thousands of miles away from a shooting and learning
about it through the mass media, there is a relatively large and growing body of Americans who
have had their lives personally touched by gun violence by having a mass shooting occur in or near
their community. One question yet to be empirically addressed is, for these citizens, does having a
mass shooting occur so close to home trigger support for increased government gun control efforts?
While there has been scholarly research on the rate at which mass public shootings have
increased in recent decades,10 as well as a number of investigations into their causes,11 surprisingly,
prior scholarship has not examined whether proximity to a mass public shooting affects citizens’
gun control policy preferences. We believe this question speaks not only to the broader literature on
the role of context in shaping public opinion, but also to the more general issue of ‘policy
feedback’12 in mass politics. In other Western nations where mass shootings have occurred, they
were swiftly followed by changes in legislation, indicating a prompt degree of policy feedback. For
example, the 1996 Dunblane Massacre of sixteen British school children and one teacher led to the
passage of two ﬁrearms acts and a permanent ban on private handgun ownership in the UK.
Likewise, the 1996 Port Arthur Massacre in Tasmania, which left thirty-ﬁve dead and twenty-three
wounded, led the Australian Government to introduce the National Firearms Agreement that
outlawed automatic and semi-automatic weapons, as well as pump-action shotguns. In the United
States, however, we have yet to see similar tragedies catalyze signiﬁcant policy change, which
raises the question: why is the United States so resistant to changes in gun legislation?
While some point to our strong culture of gun rights,13 and others to polarized responses by
elites,14 one possibility is that a key link in the policy-feedback chain – public opinion – fails to
6 http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/remarks-from-the-nra-press-conference-on-sandy-hook-school-
shooting-delivered-on-dec-21-2012-transcript/2012/12/21/bd1841fe-4b88-11e2-a6a6-aabac85e8036_story.html.
7 http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/brady-campaign-raises-5m-post-sandy-hook-086157.
8 http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/brady-campaign-raises-5m-post-sandy-hook-086157.
9 http://www.whatthefolly.com/2012/12/18/transcript-brady-campaign-pres-dan-gross-presses-lawmakers-to-
solve-americas-gun-violence-epidemic/.
10 Cohen, Azrael, and Miller 2014; Krouse and Richardson 2015.
11 Bjelopera et al. 2013; Dutton, White, and Fogarty 2013; Kissner 2016; Langman 2009; Lankford 2016;
Lankford and Hakim 2011.
12 Pierson 1993.
13 Cramer 2006; Hofstadter 1970; Melzer 2009; Squires 2000.
14 Spitzer 2011.
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respond to such incidents of extreme gun violence with augmented demand for stricter
government regulation of ﬁrearms. In this article, we theorize that mass public shootings affect
public opinion in a contextually driven manner. Our core hypothesis is that having a mass
public shooting occur in close proximity to one’s community will lead to increased support for
gun control. Germane to this causal expectation is the notion of threat salience: the basic logic
is that proximate (versus distal) threats are more salient. Mass public shootings raise the specter
of gun violence, and shootings that happen close to home involve known places and potentially
known people. In this way, public shootings occurring in close proximity should make gun
violence, as well as falling victim to gun violence, more palpable.
Using data from multiple sources on mass public shootings merged with the 2010
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), we show that increased proximity to a
mass shooting is associated with heightened public support for stricter government regulation
of ﬁrearms. Importantly, we show that this main effect does not vary by partisanship.
To demonstrate the robustness of our main ﬁnding, we show that this contextual effect is
conditional upon additional salience-related factors, such as (1) repeated events, (2) the
magnitude of the event (that is, the number of victims), and (3) the recency of events. As a
further demonstration of robustness, we offer placebo tests, which show that proximity to a
mass shooting fails to exert any effect on ‘treatment-irrelevant’ policy attitudes (for example,
climate change, abortion, gay marriage, etc.). To offer a stronger test of causal effects, we use
the 2010–2012 CCES re-interview panel to demonstrate that respondents ‘treated’ with a mass
public shooting occurring near their residence between survey waves were signiﬁcantly more
likely than ‘untreated’ respondents to shift their opinions towards support for stricter gun
control policies. Lastly, we replicate these results with different survey data collected in 2010 by
the Pew Research Center. We conclude this article by discussing the substantive implications of
our ﬁndings, as well as possible directions for future research.
PRIOR RESEARCH ON MASS SHOOTINGS AND PUBLIC OPINION
To our knowledge, little or no research has directly tested whether mass shootings affect individual
opinion towards gun control policy. There has been a great deal of descriptive analysis of polling
data about Americans’ attitudes towards gun legislation. On the one hand, recent analysis of Gallup
and Pew polling data shows that Americans in the aggregate have become steadily less supportive
of gun control over the past 25 years, dropping from clear majorities who favored gun control in
the 1990s to less than half of those surveyed by the late 2000s.15 On the other hand, the polls also
reveal spikes in support for gun control that appear to coincide with the mass shootings in
Columbine16 and Newtown;17 however, such spikes quickly regressed to the steady pattern of
declining support seen throughout the full time series. In sum, this largely descriptive body of
research suggests that American public opinion may be responsive to certain high-proﬁle mass
shootings (e.g., Sandy Hook), but that such responses represent brief bursts of opinion change that
do not endure. More importantly, the aggregate nature of the analyses contained in this work, along
with the relative absence of panel studies, limits its ability to determine whether there are any real
shifts in individual attitudes towards gun control following mass public shootings.
Research investigating how the media cover mass public shootings is more abundant in the
scholarly literature. Much of this literature focuses on examining the volume and patterns of
15 Doherty 2015; Enten 2015; Wheldon 2015; Wozniak 2015.
16 Smith 2002.
17 Wozniak 2015.
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news coverage regarding speciﬁc high-proﬁle mass attacks,18 the majority of which demonstrate
how the 1999 Columbine school shooting dominated news coverage, and by implication,
brought the issue of gun violence to the top of the national policy agenda.19 Some research
provides causal evidence that media frames about gun control affect policy attitudes. For
example, Haider-Markel and Joslyn20 ﬁnd that support for concealed carry laws declines when
the issue of carrying handguns is framed as a potential threat to public safety (versus as a matter
of constitutional rights). Moreover, McGinty, Webster and Barry21 ﬁnd that respondents
supported restricting access to ﬁrearms for the mentally ill, as well as banning large-capacity
magazines, following exposure to news stories highlighting these speciﬁc issues. Together, this
body of work suggests the possibility of policy feedback in the form of public demand for gun
control in response to mass shootings, albeit such feedback appears highly contingent upon
issue framing.
This body of media-centered research on mass shootings is strongly predicated upon
viewing mass shootings as something Americans experience indirectly through media imagery
and discourse. Yet the sheer volume, not to mention the increasing rate and geographic
spread, of mass public shootings in the United States suggests looking beyond such pretenses,
as there is an ever-growing subset of the American public that is personally touched by gun
violence due to residing in, or near, a location where a mass shooting has occurred. For these
citizens, the mass media is not the primary vehicle for experiencing egregious gun violence.
Furthermore, when conceptualizing mass public shootings as a treatment delivered through
the mass media, it is important to recall that many Americans fail to pay attention to the
news and public affairs,22 and among those who do pay attention, there is a pronounced
tendency for selective exposure to partisan news.23 In other words, there is variation in receipt
of the treatment, as well as heterogeneity in the content of the treatment; each suggests a limited
real-world meaning of framing effects observed through forced exposure in experimental
contexts.
In sum, the limitations in the existing social science literature on the impact of mass public
shootings, and gun violence more generally, on public opinion suggest looking beyond
descriptive analyses of aggregate data, as well as beyond variation in media coverage and
frames. What is distinctly missing is research focusing on another important form of variation in
exposure to gun violence via mass public shootings – spatial variation in proximity to where
these events occur. Indeed, the literature currently lacks any investigation of whether exposure
to mass shootings via proximity to where they occur is systematically related to citizens’ views
on gun control. Nor has there been a study of whether individuals change their opinions over
time in response to exposure to a mass shooting.
MASS SHOOTINGS IN CONTEXT: PROXIMITY AND THE SALIENCE OF GUN VIOLENCE
Three bodies of research provide a foundation for the expectation that living close to a mass
shooting should inﬂuence preferences for gun control: (1) studies examining the impact of
events on political attitudes, (2) a large and growing body of research on context and public
opinion and (3) the political psychology literature on threat.
18 E.g., Muschert and Carr 2006; Maguire, Weatherby, and Mathers 2002.
19 Altheide 2009; Chyi and McCombs 2004; Lawrence and Birkland 2004; Muschert 2009.
20 Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001.
21 McGinty, Webster, and Barry 2013.
22 Graber and Dunaway 2014.
23 Arceneaux, Johnson, and Murphy 2012.
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Scholars have long argued that prominent societal events can exert profound and lasting
effects on citizens’ political attitudes and behavior.24 For instance, Sears and Valentino25 ﬁnd
that exposure to high-intensity campaign events increases attention to politics among those who
might otherwise be apathetic, and crystalizes opinions on issues covered prior to the election.
Other scholars have found that extraordinary events like the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy,26 Hurricane Katrina27 and the 9/11 attacks28 can indelibly alter evaluations of
government, policy preferences, and a wide array of political attitudes and behaviors. Even local
events, like the Watts Riots in Los Angeles, have been shown to inﬂuence the opinions of those
living in the area.29 In sum, these ‘focusing events’ highlight the need for legislative action by
providing a stark example of why a particular policy proved ineffectual or out of line with
public opinion.30 In other words, focusing events provide citizens with an opportunity ‘to
observe and evaluate government in action’31 and thus create opportunities for feedback in the
policy-making process. Sears32 argues that ‘one criterion for assessing the robustness of a
democracy is whether or not the citizenry responds sensibly to ongoing political events’.
One important consideration in thinking about the impact of events is their spatial
component, as many potentially impactful events occur at speciﬁc locations (for example,
protests) or exert their impact differentially across local areas (for example, natural disasters).
Indeed, over the past decade there has been renewed scholarly interest in investigating how
residential context affects policy preferences and voting behavior,33 and this literature strongly
suggests that the consequences of extraordinary events should be contextually dependent.34 For
example, with respect to environmental disasters, Bishop35 demonstrates that, while the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill may have encouraged some people to favor stricter environmental
regulations following the disaster, nearby residents whose communities directly beneﬁted from
the oil industry were more likely to support drilling even after the spill. Focusing on natural
disasters, Velez and Martin36 show that the Obama administration’s acuity in preparing for
Hurricane Sandy resulted in the strongest gain in votes among citizens residing in areas most
devastated by the hurricane. Turning to race-relevant events, Enos37 ﬁnds that the large-scale
demolition of public housing projects in Chicago, which resulted in the residential displacement
of large numbers of African-American city residents, only impacted the voting behavior of
white voters residing in close proximity to demolished buildings. Additionally, Hopkins38 ﬁnds
that events related to immigration (for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the
Elian Gonzalez controversy, etc.) led to increases in anti-immigrant sentiment only among
citizens residing in areas experiencing growth in immigrant populations. Lastly, Newman
demonstrates that the 2008 Financial Crisis instigated perceptions of corporate proﬁteering and
24 Sears 2002.
25 Sears and Valentino 1997.
26 Sears 1965; Sheatsley and Feldman 1964; Sheatsley and Feldman 1965.
27 Atkeson and Maestas 2012; Huddy and Feldman 2006.
28 Huddy and Feldman 2011; Jacobson 2007; Smith, Rasinski, and Toce 2001; Traugott et al. 2002.
29 Sears and McConahay 1973.
30 Birkland, 1996; Birkland 1997; Birkland 1998; Birkland 2006; Kingdon 1984.
31 Atkeson and Maestas 2012, 4.
32 Sears 2002, 250.
33 Cho and Gimpel 2012; Rogers 2014; Wong 2010.
34 Bishop 2014; Enos 2016; Hopkins 2010; Newman 2015.
35 Bishop 2014.
36 Velez and Martin 2013.
37 Enos 2016.
38 Hopkins 2010.
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maldistribution only among citizens residing in economically depressed areas.39 In short, the
growing body of contextual research highlights the importance of situating events in space in order
to understand the effects of prominent events such as mass public shootings on public opinion.
While each of these studies concerns unique events and different policy domains, the
common thread of this research is that the ‘focusing’ quality of prominent events should vary as
a function of one’s proximity to the event. As focusing events are theorized to increase
awareness, information, and the formulation or updating of opinions about event-relevant
issues, the contextual literature suggests that these processes should be more pronounced for
citizens residing in close proximity to events. Beyond informational effects, two additional
important components of proximity are tangibility and salience: being close to an event should
make the forces, issues and – most importantly for our purposes – the threats it poses more
palpable and exigent. The effect of the 9/11 attacks, for example, was undeniably more tangible
for individuals living and working in lower Manhattan, as well as for residents of the Tri-State
Area. Numerous studies demonstrate that those living within a 100-mile radius of the World
Trade Center reported considerably higher levels of psychological distress and signs of post-
traumatic stress disorder than those living farther away from the epicenter of the attacks.40
While the mass media may draw attention to extraordinary events on the national stage, those
residing close to a speciﬁc event should be more personally touched by it. This is especially
important when the events in question involve a threat to property or well-being, such as with
natural and environmental disasters, public health disasters, or incidents of random and
egregious gun violence. In short, those residing closer to destructive events should have a more
palpable experience of the incident, a heighted perception of threat and an increased sense of the
risk of future victimization.
Thus the literature on perceived threat and anxiety helps us explain one potential mechanism
through which proximity to mass shootings may impact their salience. First, we know that
humans are acutely attuned to threatening stimuli in their environment.41 Yet we also know that
not all threats are created equal, and reactions to threatening stimuli should differ depending on
the speciﬁc type of threat encountered. For instance, Huddy and colleagues have argued that it is
necessary to distinguish between general threats to the nation and personal threats to the
individual; the latter increase feelings of personal vulnerability and motivate self-protective
action.42 Personal threat, which arises from proximate physical danger, is likely to elicit more
anxiety than remote threats to the nation.43 For instance, approximately 75 per cent of New
Yorkers were worried that they or their family members would be the victim of a future attack,
compared to only 31 per cent of all Americans, in the weeks after the 9/11 attacks.44 Others
have found that those living in the Northeast expressed greater anxiety and felt more personally
threatened by terrorism after 9/11 than Americans living in other regions of the country.45 In
addition, social or psychological proximity in the form of knowing someone who was
victimized by a terrorist event heightened the sense of personal vulnerability and feelings of
anxiety after 9/11.46 In this sense, mass public shootings should serve as extraordinary focusing
39 Newman 2015.
40 Schlenger et al. 2002; Schuster et al. 2001.
41 Dijksterhuis and Aarts 2003; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000.
42 Huddy et al. 2002; Huddy et al. 2005; Huddy and Feldman 2011; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007;
Huddy, Feldman, and Weber 2007.
43 Huddy et al. 2002; Huddy et al. 2005.
44 Huddy et al. 2002.
45 Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen 2004.
46 Huddy et al. 2005; Huddy et al. 2007.
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events that increase feelings of personal threat and anxiety among nearby residents, thus
triggering the brain’s ‘surveillance system’.47 These feelings of threat and anxiety, in turn,
should motivate individuals to seek out information about the issue and to support actions that
would reduce the threat of victimization by gun violence.
To summarize, the literature on focusing events suggests that a catastrophe like a mass
shooting should increase public scrutiny of the issue of gun violence, as well as highlight the
need for legislative action to remedy the problem. The research on contextual effects highlights
the spatial component of mass shootings – that is, individuals residing in or near targeted
communities bear the brunt of the tragedy, and by implication, should manifest more acute
effects than those living farther away. Finally, the scholarly work on perceived threat suggests
that individuals should respond to personally threatening stimuli with heightened vigilance,
searching for ways to mitigate the danger and reduce feelings of vulnerability. Taken together,
these three bodies of work lay a strong foundation for the expectation that proximity to a mass
public shooting should make the threat of gun violence more palpable and salient, which in turn
should stimulate demand for greater government restrictions on access to ﬁrearms. We translate
this expectation into the core hypothesis of this article:
HYPOTHESIS 1 (Proximity Hypothesis): Living in close proximity to a mass public shooting
should generate support for gun control.
One important issue to address is possible heterogeneity in citizens’ interpretation of (and
response to) events. Hypothesis 1 suggests that proximity to mass shootings should make the
threat of gun violence more salient to all nearby residents irrespective of their previous attitudes
or partisan leanings, and that this should increase support for gun control generally. This
expectation is supported by research demonstrating that perceived threats affect policy
preferences independently of partisanship, political ideology or even personality traits such as
authoritarianism.48 One alternative, however, is that the motivation to maintain one’s previously
held beliefs about gun control inﬂuences how one interprets mass shootings.49 Prior attitudes
and partisanship are strong motivational factors in citizens’ political reasoning,50 and may cause
divergences in perceptions of culpability for mass shootings and beliefs concerning the
subsequent reduction of risk.
Thus, there could be differences in how partisans perceive the issue of gun control, and polls
show that Democrats and Republicans approach the issue from vastly difference perspectives.51
While most citizens seem to agree that gun violence is a problem, they strongly disagree about how
best to reduce such atrocities.52 On the one hand, Democrats support gun control policies, which
they believe will limit access to dangerous ﬁrearms, and by extension, reduce the likelihood of
becoming a victim of a mass public shooting. Republicans, on the other hand, prefer policies that
allow law-abiding citizens to carry ﬁrearms (concealed or otherwise) for their own self-defense.
They argue that the only way to deter the use of force is by meeting that force head on. This
partisan argument ﬁts well with existing theories on motivated reasoning.53 In short, countering our
principal hypothesis, an important counterhypothesis predicts that the effect of proximity to mass
public shootings will be conditional upon partisanship, with left-leaning citizens potentially
47 Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000.
48 Huddy et al. 2005; Kam and Kinder 2007; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009.
49 Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2013.
50 Lodge and Taber 2000; Taber and Lodge 2006.
51 Pew Research Center 2012; PublicMind 2015; Silver 2012.
52 Craighill and Clement 2015.
53 Kunda 1990.
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becoming more supportive of gun control but right-leaning citizens either evincing no effect or
becoming less supportive. This leads to the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2 (Partisan-Motivated Reasoning Hypothesis): Proximity to a mass public shooting
should generate support for gun control among citizens identifying with the
political left (Democrats), but not among those identifying with the political right
(Republicans).
DATA AND METHODS
As an initial test of our hypotheses, we draw upon the 2010 CCES – Common Content.54
In addition to offering the beneﬁt of a very large national sample of adult Americans (N = 55,400),
the 2010 CCES includes (1) a measure of respondents’ preferences towards government regulation
of ﬁrearms, (2) a range of essential control variables and (3) county Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) and zip codes for all respondents. The provision of geocodes enables us to locate
respondents spatially, to allow us to test whether reported preferences for gun control are
systematically related to the proximity of respondents’ place of residence to mass public shootings.
The dependent variable for this analysis is a standard gun control question: ‘In general, do you feel
that laws covering the sale of ﬁrearms should be made more strict, less strict, or kept as they are?’
From this item, we constructed an ordinal variable recoded to range: (1) ‘Less strict’ [19 per cent],
(2) ‘Kept as they are’ [39.4 per cent] and (3) ‘More strict’ [41.6 per cent].
To measure our primary predictor – proximity to a mass public shooting – we ﬁrst had to
identify all known mass shooting events in the nation. For this task, we identiﬁed three different
data sources: (1) the Stanford Geospatial Center’s ‘Mass Shootings in America’ project,55
(2) USA Today’s ‘Behind the Bloodshed’ mass killing database56 and (3) Mother Jones’ ‘A
Guide to Mass Shootings in America’ database.57 The differences between these databases are
nuanced and revolve around whether (1) the database included events in which victims were
killed only with guns or with other weapons (explosives, knives, motor vehicles, etc.), (2) the
targets of the attack were family, government or random members of the general public, (3) the
cut-off for being deﬁned as a ‘mass’ event was 3, 4 or more than 4 people injured or killed, and
(4) the time frame of the data collection.
We combined results from these databases into a single dataset,58 retaining cases involving
(1) ﬁrearms as the primary weapon used, (2) attacks on non-family members of the general
public and (3) attacks in which at least three or more individuals were injured or killed.59 Thus
our ‘treatment’ of interest is exposure to incidents where a shooter opened ﬁre in a public place
54 Ansolebehere 2012. The 2010 CCES was conducted over the internet by YouGov/Polimetrix between October
and November. The CCES employs a matched random sample methodology, and achieved an AAPOR response rate
(deﬁnition 3) of 41.8 per cent. For more information about this survey, please see Ansolebehere (2012).
55 Data available at: https://library.stanford.edu/projects/mass-shootings-america.
56 Data available at: http://www.gannett-cdn.com/GDContent/mass-killings/index.html#title.
57 This data can be obtained here: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map.
58 One beneﬁt of combining these data sources is that it increases the exhaustiveness of our data. For example,
these databases rely upon different sources of information, with the Stanford data relying on online reports and
the USA Today data relying on FBI reports. Additionally, we beneﬁt from the efforts by these agents to enhance
existing data sources, as is the case with the USA Today data, where FBI reports were enhanced where lacking,
such as in the event of data errors or missing cases. Replication data and code are available at the Harvard
Dataverse: https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.7910/DVN/LL6UTV.
59 We use these criteria because our primary interest is in mass public shootings, so we exclude mass killing
incidents not involving the use of ﬁrearms, where the victims were all family members, and other gang- or drug-
related shootings.
8 NEWMAN AND HARTMAN
(for example, school, shopping mall, movie theater, church, etc.) targeting seemingly random
members of the public. Using these restrictions, we were left with a database containing
N = 210 mass public shooting events between 1966 to 2015; 50 per cent of these events
occurred after 2007, and 75 per cent of these cases occurred after 1994. Therefore we see that
mass shootings have been increasing over time, particularly over the past 15 to 20 years.60 The
average number killed in these events was 4.5 people (min = 0, max = 33 [Virginia Tech
Shooting]), and the average number injured (excluding those killed) was 5 (min = 0,
max = 58 [Movie Theater Shooting in Aurora, CO]). Figure 1 presents a map of this data,
which marks each event’s location and varies the size of the markers according to the number of
persons injured or killed.
Using this data, we constructed a measure labeled Proximity to Shooting, which captures the
distance in miles between the centroid of a respondent’s zip code of residence and the exact
location of the nearest mass shooting event.61 Since we match this data with 2010 CCES data,
we constructed the distance variable using mass shootings that occur beginning in 1966 and
concluding in October 2010 (when the 2010 CCES data collection commenced). Thus for each
Fig. 1. Location of mass public shootings in the continental United States, 1966–2015
Note: the size of the circle marker corresponds to the number of injured and killed. The map was created in
TileMill®, with state lines drawn from 2014 cartographic boundary shapeﬁles from the US Census Bureau
(https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/cbf/cbf_state.html).
60 While it is possible that earlier incidents of mass public shootings have been missed or under-reported in the
databases we utilize, all of the available evidence suggests that these types of events are increasing in frequency.
For instance, the FBI conducted a comprehensive review of active shooter incidents and concluded that mass
public shootings having been increasing annually since 2000 (Blair and Schweit 2014).
61 Zip code locations were obtained from the US Census Bureau’s Zip Code Tabulation Area Cartographic
Boundary Files (https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/2014-cartographic-boundary-ﬁle-5-digit-zip-code-tabulation-
area-for-united-states-1-500000). Zip code centroids were computed using the ST_Centroid function from
PostGIS (http://www.postgis.org/), the geographical extensions to the open source PostgreSQL open source
database engine (http://www.postgresql.org/). Distances between zip code centroids and shooting locations were
computed using the ST_Distance function from PostGIS.
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respondent, this measure captures the distance between their (relatively approximate)
place of residence and the nearest mass shooting. Importantly, for ease of interpretation of
the results, we recoded this variable to range from farther to closer (in miles) to an event. The
mean distance nationally (within the 2010 CCES) is 84 miles (54 miles), with a standard
deviation of 112 miles (55 miles). The range of this variable in the CCES data is 870 to 0 miles,
indicating some respondents lived as far as 870 miles away from the nearest shooting event,
while some respondents lived in a zip code housing one or more mass shootings.62 Our analysis
includes controls for standard contextual and individual demographic variables, as well as
key contextual variables that in theory may inﬂuence both (1) the location of mass shooting
events and (2) respondents’ preferences over gun control policy. At the contextual level, our
analysis includes zip code-level controls for median income, rates of college education, racial
composition, population density and total population.63 To separate out the effect of proximity
to a mass shooting from variation in the occurrence of murders more generally, we include
a control for the Murders Per Capita in a respondent’s county of residence.64 It is also
possible that the number of ﬁrearms in the local area inﬂuences the likelihood of a mass
shooting and attitudes toward gun control. Thus, we control for Firearm Stores Per
Capita within a respondent’s county.65 Next, we include a control for Republican Vote in
respondents’ county of residence,66 as the level of liberalism versus conservatism in an
area may inﬂuence the occurrence of mass shootings and is likely correlated to individual
residents’ views on gun control. Last, as mass shootings tend to cluster in certain states
(for example, California, New York, Texas, Washington, Colorado), we control for the
number of shootings in a respondents’ state of residence (Shootings in State) to ensure that
proximity to a mass shooting is not simply capturing residence in a state with more shooting
events.
A few descriptive statistics are worth discussing. First, we ﬁnd moderate negative correlations
between Proximity to Shooting and Republican Vote (r= −0.28) and Firearm Stores Per Capita
(r= −0.38), and weak positive correlations with zip code Population Density
(r= 0.21), Median Income (r= 0.15 ) and College Education (r= 0.15). Thus, rather than
mass shootings being entirely random events, they instead appear to be slightly more likely to
occur in liberal, semi-urban settings where guns are seemingly less prevalent. The possibility
that these variables even remotely predict where shootings occur increases the importance of
their inclusion as controls, as each factor is also plausibly linked to views on gun control.
Turning to the individual level, our analysis includes standard demographic controls
(education, income, age, gender, race and residence in the South), as well as dummy variables
for Homeowners and respondents with Children, as it is possible that owning a home or having
children alters views on home safety and gun control. We include dummy variables for whether
a respondent is enlisted in the Military, or whether they report being from a Military Family, as
it is likely that individuals in the service, or with family members in the service, hold more
62 When excluding Hawaii and Alaska, the range of this variable narrows from 0 to 377 miles.
63 These data are from the US Census Bureau’s 2007–2011 American Community Survey 5-Year File.
64 This measure was constructed from the 2008 FBI Uniform Crime Report county ‘Reported Offenses’ data
(http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/27644). Murders Per Capita is the total number of
murders in a county divided by the total population.
65 This measure was constructed from the January 2010 ‘Listing of Federal Firearms Licensees’ from the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (https://www.atf.gov/ﬁrearms/listing-federal-ﬁrearms-
licensees-fﬂs-2015). It is the total number of licensed ﬁrearm vendors in a county divided by the total population.
66 Republican Vote is the percent of votes in the 2008 presidential election in each county going to John
McCain (R). This data is from David Leip’s Atlas of US Presidential Elections (http://uselectionatlas.org/).
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favorable views towards gun rights. Last, we include controls for political and symbolic
orientations (Party ID, Ideology and Religiosity), as these variables are known to inﬂuence a
range of views on key political issues, including gun control. For more information about
question wording and variable measurement, see Appendix A.
RESULTS
Given the ordinal nature of our dependent variable, as well as the hierarchical structure of our
data (individual respondents embedded within zip codes), we estimated multilevel ordered-
logistic regression models with random intercepts for zip code. The results from our analysis are
presented in Column 1 of Table 1. As can be seen, the results strongly align with expectations,
as an increase in proximity to a mass public shooting is associated with a signiﬁcant increase in
support for stricter gun control laws (β= 0.334, s.e. = 0.172, p< 0.05).67
The size of this effect is displayed in Figure 2, which presents the ﬁrst differences in the
predicted probability of supporting stricter gun control laws associated with a change in
Proximity to Shooting. The ﬁrst plotted coefﬁcient (labeled ‘Proximity’) indicates that going
from respondents residing in zips the furthest away (Pr(Y) = 0.322) to those housing a mass
shooting (Pr(Y) = 0.394) is associated with a 0.072 increase in the probability of desiring
stricter gun regulations. One way of conceptualizing this effect is with an analogy to
experimental research where the estimated quantity of interest is the difference in an outcome
between the treated and untreated. In our case, respondents residing furthest away from a mass
shooting reside in the state of Alaska, which is spatially separated from the continental US and
did not experience a mass public shooting during the 1966 to 2010 time period.68 Thus, the
comparison between respondents in this zip code and those in zip codes housing a mass public
shooting can be viewed as representing a comparison between ‘untreated’ Americans and those
receiving the strongest ‘dose’ of the treatment by having a mass public shooting occur in their
neighborhood. While a change of 0.072 appears to be a modest effect, it represents over a 20 per
cent increase in the probability of supporting stricter gun laws.
Turning to the contextual controls in Table 1, we ﬁnd some interesting but unsurprising
effects. First, we see that residing in more population-dense, well-educated, politically liberal
and racially diverse areas is associated with increased support for gun control. Countering these
effects, however, we see that residing in areas with higher murder rates and more ﬁrearm stores
per capita is associated with signiﬁcant decreases in support for gun control. This latter effect
strongly conﬁrms the suspicion that areas with a strong ‘gun culture’ inﬂuence views on gun
control. Indeed, moving from areas with less than 1 ﬁrearm store per 1,000 people to an area
with 9.7 ﬁrearm stores per 1,000 people is associated with roughly a 0.40 decrease in the
probability of preferring stricter gun control laws. This large effect is only paralleled by that of
education rates, where moving from zip codes with no college-educated residents to those
where every resident has at least a bachelor’s degree is associated with a 0.39 increase in the
67 We should note that the results in Table 1 hold when estimating a three-level model including random intercepts
for zip code and county (see Appendix Table B1). Additionally, we test for a possible nonlinear effect of proximity to
a shooting and ﬁnd no evidence of nonlinearity (Appendix Table B2). Furthermore, living near a mass shooting only
affects gun control attitudes among those who were alive when the event occurred (Appendix Table B3), which may
be interpreted as a validity check on our ﬁndings. Last, while we analyze the effect of Proximity to Shooting
conditional upon the time elapsed since the shooting later in this manuscript, we do ﬁnd that the results in column 1 of
Table 1 hold when including Time Elapsed since the nearest shooting as a control variable (Table B4).
68 The 1984 Manley Hot Springs murders in Alaska are not classiﬁed as a mass public shooting; rather, they
are classiﬁed as a spree killing, as the killer (Michael A. Silka) murdered his victims in a private location (versus
a public space) over the course of several hours.
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TABLE 1 The Effect of Proximity to Mass Shootings on Preferences over Gun Control Policy
Nearest
shooting
Two nearest
shootings
Three nearest
shootings
Proximity to Shooting 0.334*
(0.172)
Avg. Proximity 0.372* 0.422**
(0.148) (0.158)
Contextual Controls
Median Income 0.051 0.052 0.051
(0.152) (0.151) (0.151)
College Education 1.72*** 1.71*** 1.71***
(0.219) (0.219) (0.219)
Percent Black 0.261*** 0.254*** 0.252***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075)
Republican Vote −0.349*** −0.366*** −0.365***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Murders Per Capita −0.819** −0.850** −0.845**
(0.287) (0.287) (0.287)
Firearm Stores Per Capita −59.41*** −60.04*** −60.25***
(6.76) (6.64) (6.62)
Population Density 1.08*** 1.07*** 1.07***
(0.230) (0.230) (0.230)
Total Population 0.162* 0.165* 0.166*
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Shootings in State −0.017*** −0.017*** −0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Individual Controls
Education 0.256*** 0.257*** 0.257***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Income 0.124** 0.124** 0.124**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Age 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male −0.787*** −0.787*** −0.787***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Black 0.327*** 0.327*** 0.327***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Hispanic 0.428*** 0.428*** 0.428***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Asian 0.414*** 0.428*** 0.430***
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
Homeowner −0.065** −0.066** −0.066**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Children 0.015 0.015 0.015
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Military −0.308** −0.304** −0.304**
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Military Family −0.234*** −0.233*** −0.233***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Party ID −1.57*** −1.57*** −1.57***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Ideology −2.44*** −2.44*** −2.44***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Religiosity 0.072* 0.072* 0.072*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
South 0.051* 0.051* 0.050*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
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probability of supporting stricter gun laws. Thus while we observe statistically signiﬁcant and
substantively meaningful changes in support for gun control as a function of proximity to a
mass public shooting, the most powerful effects are driven by variables related to local culture,
with pronounced but expected differences emerging between respondents in rural, conservative
and gun-heavy areas and those residing in urban, liberal areas with few ﬁrearm stores.
TABLE 1 (Continued )
Nearest
shooting
Two nearest
shootings
Three nearest
shootings
Thresholds
Cut 1 −3.42 −3.40 −3.35
(0.179) (0.155) (0.164)
Cut 2 −0.958 −0.933 −0.883
(0.178) (0.155) (0.163)
# of Individuals 53,775 53,775 53,775
# of Zip Codes 14,781 14,781 14,781
Note: entries are unstandardized regression coefﬁcients from multilevel regression models with random
intercepts (zip) estimated using gllamm in the software package Stata®. Reported signiﬁcance levels are
based upon two-tailed hypothesis tests. Source: 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study –
Common Content. *p< 0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Fig. 2. Impact of proximity to a mass public shooting on change in the probability of support for gun control
Note: entries are point estimates for the ﬁrst difference in the predicted probability of preferring gun control laws
be made ‘more strict’ associated with changes in proximity variables, holding all control variables at their mean
values. Vertical bars intersecting point estimates are 90 per cent conﬁdence intervals. Each listed estimate is the
effect from a separate model. ‘Proximity’ is Proximity to Shooting, and ‘Avg. Prox (2)’ and ‘Avg. Prox (3)’ are
the average proximity to the nearest two or three shooting events. Changes in the proximity variables are from
minimum to maximum values. Probabilities obtained from post-estimation analysis using CLARIFY (Tomz,
Wittenberg, and King 2003). Source: 2010 CCES.
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Shifting our focus to the individual-level controls, we see that gun control is more likely to be
opposed by men, homeowners, individuals in the military or from military families, and by
those identifying with the political right. Conversely, gun control is more likely to be supported
by those of higher socio-economic status and by non-whites. In the sections that follow, we
address key threats to causal inference stemming from our use of cross-sectional observational
data. We demonstrate through a series of robustness checks, including the use of panel data, that
our results hold.
Partisan-Motivated Reasoning
To test the partisan-motivated reasoning hypothesis, we re-estimated the model in Column 1 of
Table 1 among Democrats, Independents and Republicans separately.69 We present the results
from this analysis in Figure 2, as well as Appendix Table B5. Figure 2 presents the change in
the predicted probability of supporting stricter gun control laws associated with an increase in
Proximity to Shooting among Democratic, Independent and Republican respondents. As can be
seen, there are no signiﬁcant differences in the effects of proximity when focusing on
respondents situated at opposite ends, or in the middle, of the partisanship spectrum.70 The
effect of proximity is noticeably larger for Independents, and the pattern of results suggests that
the policy preferences of Independents and Republicans are more responsive to proximity to
mass shootings than those of Democrats. However, rather than these effects being due to
Democrats being unfazed by mass shootings, closer inspection of the data suggests they likely
derive from a ceiling effect: the average value of the dependent variable (ranging from 1 to 3) is
2.6 among Democrats, 2.1 among Independents and 1.85 among Republicans. Thus, we
observe increasing room for the movement of policy opinion as we move from Democrats to
Republicans. The takeaway point of these results is that the effect of Proximity to Shooting
observed in the full sample is not driven by one speciﬁc partisan group in a manner that is
statistically signiﬁcant. In short, we fail to uncover evidence of motivated reasoning in reactions
to mass shootings.
ROBUSTNESS CHECK : OMITTED VARIABLE BIAS
One concern with our results is that, despite the inclusion of a comprehensive range of controls,
the observed association between proximity to a mass shooting and gun control attitudes may
nonetheless be capturing the effect of an omitted variable. Such a variable might predict
variation in both where mass shootings occur and gun control attitudes. This problem subsumes
other related concerns, such as residential self-selection. One plausible omitted-variable
explanation for our results is the possibility that, since mass shootings are slightly more likely to
occur in liberal, semi-urban areas, our ﬁndings could be due to the association of these
environmental characteristics with holding liberal views on gun policy, and to those with liberal
views selecting into liberal environments where mass shootings are slightly more likely to
occur. It is important to reiterate that this logic highlights the importance of controlling for
population density, contextual partisanship and individual political orientations, which are
included in all of our analyses.
69 We deﬁne Democrats (Republicans) using the 7-point standard Party ID scale as those identifying as either
a ‘Strong Democrat (Republican)’ or a ‘Democrat (Republican)’. Independents are deﬁned as those neither
afﬁliating with, nor leaning towards, either party. We should note that we fail to uncover signiﬁcant differences
by partisanship when expanding the deﬁnition of Democrats (Republicans) to include ‘leaning Democrat
(Republicans)’.
70 We should note that these null results replicate when using separate survey data (see Appendix Table B10).
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Repeated Events, Magnitude and Recency
One method of assessing the robustness of our ﬁndings in light of this potential omitted variable
problem is to determine whether our ﬁndings vary depending upon additional factors, which
according to our theory should enhance or attenuate our initial ﬁndings. Here, we explore the
role of (1) repeated events, (2) the magnitude of an event and (3) the time elapsed since an
event. Each of these variables in theory should relate to the salience of mass shootings, and of
gun violence more generally: (1) residing near repeated mass shootings may increase the
salience of gun violence over that obtained by a single event, (2) mass shootings that take a
greater toll on human life may make gun violence more salient than those with fewer casualties
and injuries and (3) the time elapsed since a shooting may attenuate its theorized effect on the
salience of gun violence. In short, a critical question for our research is, when analyzing
repeated shootings or the effect of proximity to a shooting conditional upon the number of
victims or time elapsed, do the results from these more nuanced analyses ‘behave’ in ways that
accord with our hypothesis or with the omitted variable counterhypothesis?
We begin with repeated events: according to our theory, proximity to a mass shooting should
make gun violence, and the risk of victimization, more salient. One logical deduction of this
expectation is that residing near more than one mass shooting should increase the ‘treatment
effect’. This leads to the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3 (Repeated Events Hypothesis): Residing near multiple mass shootings will be
associated with more support for gun control than that observed for residing
near a single mass shooting.
Turning to the magnitude of an event, one logical deduction of our theory is that mass
shootings with high casualty and injured counts should have a larger ‘treatment effect’ than
events with fewer killed or injured. Indeed, research on other events, such as natural disasters,
ﬁnds that the magnitude of an event is associated with the size of its effect on experienced
stress71 and subsequent political behavior.72 This leads to the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 4 (Event Magnitude Hypothesis): The effect of proximity to a mass public shooting
on support for gun control should increase with the number of victims.
Last, when looking at the time elapsed since shootings, a ﬁnal logical deduction of our theory
is that the salience of gun violence aroused by mass public shootings should dissipate as time
passes. Research in psychology indicates that the time horizon of events affects how people
think about such events, with temporally proximate events visualized in a more concrete and
visceral fashion than temporally distant events.73 This leads to the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 5 (Dissipation Hypothesis): The effect of proximity to a mass public shooting on
support for gun control should dissipate as time passes.
To test the repeated events hypothesis, we constructed a variable labeled Average Proximity,
which measures the average distance in miles from the centroid of respondents’ zip code of
residence to the two nearest mass shootings, as well as to the three nearest mass shootings. We
re-estimate the model in Column 1 of Table 1 using these averaged proximity variables and
present the results in Table 1, Columns 2 and 3. As can be seen, not only do the results hold, the
statistical signiﬁcance and size of the effects moderately increase (see Figure 2). While the
71 Freedy et al. 1994.
72 Velez and Martin 2013.
73 Trope and Liberman 2003.
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increase is modest, the results do suggest that the impact of proximity to a mass public shooting
on support for gun control strengthens when living close to more than one shooting. Moreover,
when analyzing a different sample and dependent variable in the section below, we observe
more drastic increases in support for gun control associated with proximity to multiple mass
shootings (Table 4 and Figure 3 below). To test the Event Magnitude hypothesis, we re-
estimated the model in Column 1 of Table 1 at varying values of the total number of victims
(killed + injured) of an event and present the results in Figure 2, as well as Appendix Table B5.
Figure 2 shows that when focusing only on mass shootings with fewer than ﬁve victims (25th
percentile), there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference in gun control preferences between
those residing far versus close to the shooting. However, as we focus on events with an
increasing number of total victims,74 we see that the effect of proximity gains in signiﬁcance
and effect size. Last, with respect to our Dissipation hypothesis, we ﬁnd that the results hold
when focusing on shootings occurring more than 10 years ago (that is, before 2000),75 but do
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Fig. 3. Impact of change in proximity to shooting on change in probability of favoring gun control over gun rights
Note: entries are point estimates for the ﬁrst difference in the predicted probability of believing gun control IS more
important than gun rights associated with changes in the values of key predictor variables. Vertical bars intersecting
point estimates are 90 per cent conﬁdence intervals. ‘Proximity’ is Proximity to Shooting, and ‘Avg. Prox (2)’ and
‘Avg. Prox (3)’ are the average proximity to the nearest two or three shooting events. Changes in the proximity
variables are from minimum to maximum values. Probabilities obtained from post-estimation analysis using
CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003). Source: 2010 Pew Survey.
74 We should note that the cut-points used for this analysis represent meaningful percentile values of the total
number of victims for the nearest mass shooting. Five victims represents the 25th percentile value of this variable,
eight victims represents the median value, and twenty victims the 90th percentile.
75 Additional analyses reveal that this effect is restricted to respondents who report having lived at their
current address at the time of the shooting (see Table B6 in Appendix B), which provides an important validity
check to this result, as we are conﬁdent that these respondents received the ‘treatment’. However, it is possible
that individuals moving into an area after a mass shooting are impacted via ‘local collective memory’ (May
2000). Such a possibility, while interesting, is beyond the scope of this analysis and is best left for future
research.
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not hold for shootings occurring more than 20 years ago (that is, before 1990).76 Thus when we
focus on proximity to shootings occurring farther back in time, we fail to uncover any systematic
difference in gun control attitudes between those residing close to, compared to those residing far
from, the events in question.77 We only ﬁnd a systematic relationship between proximity and gun
control attitudes when focusing on mass shootings occurring within the past 20 years.
Taken together, these ﬁndings help shore up potential doubt about the results presented in
Table 1. When subjected to more nuanced analysis, we demonstrate that the pattern of results
varies according to our theory: proximity to mass shootings – as well as proximity to repeated
events, more horriﬁc events and more recent events – increases the salience of gun violence, and
thus garners support for gun control. These patterns of results work to render an omitted
variable explanation for our initial results increasingly untenable. Indeed, the clearest way to
discount this additional evidence would be to make the argument that mass shooters are not
only more likely to stage their attacks in areas where residents favor gun control, but are also
more likely to kill and injure more people in such areas. An omitted-variable explanation for our
main results would also require arguing that attackers in 1970–90 were randomly generated
across environs and/or were indiscriminate about the location of their attacks, but that this
process fundamentally changed over the past two decades. We ﬁnd these counterarguments
untenable. For example, while mass shootings are slightly more likely to occur in population-
dense, Democratic voting areas, the total number of victims of a mass shooting is entirely
uncorrelated to Population Density (r = −0.05) and Republican Vote (r = 0.08).
Preferences Over Treatment-Irrelevant Policy Issues
If the omitted-variable counterhypothesis is correct, and mass shootings tend to occur in areas
that, for example, are more politically liberal, then the relationship we observe between
proximity to shootings and gun control attitudes should also be observed for other political
issues. Thus an important additional (placebo) test of the robustness of our results is whether the
effects we observe for proximity to a mass shooting on gun control attitudes inﬂuence
‘treatment-irrelevant’ political attitudes. To test this, we estimated the model in Column 1 of
Table 1 substituting for gun control four presumably treatment-irrelevant policy issues:
(1) belief in Climate Change (2) support for a woman’s right to an Abortion, (3) support for Gay
Marriage and (4) support for granting legal status to undocumented workers living in the United
States (Immigration). For full question wordings for these policy items, see Appendix A. We
present the results from this analysis in Table 2.
Table 2 demonstrates that proximity to a mass shooting does not increase the holding of
liberal positions on any of these other prominent issues. On the contrary, we only uncover a
76 The 10- and 20-year cut-points used in this analysis roughly correspond to the median and 75th percentile
values for the time elapsed since the nearest mass shooting. Perhaps more important than representing statisti-
cally meaningful cut-points, however, is that 10-year increments of time are inherently substantively meaningful
to readers and represent intuitively comprehensible units for observing the dissipation in the effect of Proximity
to Shooting over time.
77 One alternative explanation for this null result is that there is error in the measurement of Proximity to
Shooting as a function of elapsed time and urbanicity. For example, the Stanford data relies on online reports, and
it is possible that events occurring pre-1990 in smaller towns are more likely to have been overlooked than those
occurring in larger cities. If this were the case, it would result in some unknown subset of respondents residing
near a pre-1990 mass public shooting being miscoded as residing far away, yielding a test comparing those
‘treated’ by proximity to a shooting to a set of respondents for whom some unknown subset was also ‘treated’,
thus biasing the estimated effect of proximity towards 0. We demonstrate in Appendix Table B7 that this null
result does not change when performing median-split subsample analyses by population size or density.
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TABLE 2 The Effect of Proximity to Mass Shootings on Other Policy Attitudes
Climate change Abortion Gay marriage Immigration
Proximity to Shooting −0.058 −0.034 0.223 −0.148
(0.156) (0.172) (0.210) (0.196)
Contextual Controls
Median Income −0.296* 0.276^ −0.316^ −0.285^
(0.135) (0.154) (0.189) (0.167)
College Education 0.908*** 1.13*** 2.50*** 1.36***
(0.196) (0.221) (0.272) (0.240)
Percent Black 0.066 0.151* −0.041 0.159*
(0.066) (0.073) (0.085) (0.078)
Republican Vote −0.341*** −0.140^ −0.268** 0.080
(0.069) (0.076) (0.093) (0.086)
Murders Per Capita −0.628* 0.409 −0.087 0.166
(0.257) (0.286) (0.345) (0.313)
Firearm Stores Per Capita −21.61*** −8.85 −28.70*** −1.37
(6.00) (6.38) (8.26) (7.70)
Population Density 0.487** 0.350 −0.421^ 0.117
(0.179) (0.215) (0.251) (0.203)
Total Population −0.106^ 0.147* −0.009 −0.152*
(0.061) (0.069) (0.083) (0.076)
Shootings in State 0.000 0.014*** −0.007** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Individual Controls
Education 0.356*** 0.489*** 0.912*** 0.515***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.044) (0.040)
Income −0.099* 0.615*** 0.326*** 0.160***
(0.039) (0.043) (0.052) (0.048)
Age −0.003*** 0.010*** −0.008*** −0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male −0.220*** −0.423*** −0.324*** −0.179***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022)
Black −0.225*** 0.081* −0.905*** 0.052
(0.033) (0.036) (0.042) (0.038)
Hispanic 0.205*** −0.424*** −0.277*** 0.903***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.046) (0.042)
Asian 0.251*** −0.537*** −0.705*** 0.040
(0.078) (0.083) (0.102) (0.089)
Homeowner −0.106*** 0.038 −0.081** −0.109***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.028) (0.026)
Children 0.000 −0.068** −0.225*** −0.021
(0.021) (0.023) (0.028) (0.026)
Military 0.023 0.002 −0.385** −0.115
(0.107) (0.114) (0.136) (0.137)
Military Family −0.075** 0.021 −0.083* −0.073*
(0.027) (0.029) (0.036) (0.035)
Party ID −2.26*** −1.08*** −1.52*** −1.45***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.042) (0.040)
Ideology −3.41*** −2.62*** −2.66*** −2.29***
(0.046) (0.048) (0.058) (0.053)
Religiosity −0.269*** −2.87*** −2.15*** 0.107**
(0.030) (0.036) (0.042) (0.037)
South 0.018 0.043^ −0.036 −0.039
(0.020) (0.023) (0.027) (0.026)
Constant 4.01 1.33
(0.220) (0.203)
Thresholds Not Presented Not Presented
# of Individuals 53,725 53,484 53,833 53,833
# of Zip Codes 14,777 14,754 14,787 14,787
Note: entries are unstandardized regression coefﬁcients from multilevel regression models with random
intercepts (zip) estimated using gllamm and xtlogit in the software package Stata®. Reported signiﬁcance
levels are based upon two-tailed hypothesis tests. Source: 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election
Study – Common Content. ^p< 0.10, *p< 0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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systematic relationship between Proximity to Shooting and preferences over gun control laws.
These null ﬁndings further bolster not only our conﬁdence in our original ﬁnding, but the causal
inference we seek to make from these ﬁndings.
Retest Using Panel Data
In a ﬁnal attempt to address the omitted variable counterhypothesis, as well as the more general
issue of the limitations on causal inference from the use of cross-sectional data, we conducted
an analysis of the 2010–12 CCES Panel Study.78 An N = 9,500 subset of the total N = 55,400
participants in the 2010 CCES was re-interviewed in October and November 2012. One beneﬁt
of using this panel is its large size and low attrition rate relative to other popular panels (for
example, American National Election Study panels). Further, as noted by Ansolebehere and
Schaffner,79 the demographic and partisan characteristics of the panel respondents do not
signiﬁcantly differ from those of the larger 2010 CCES cross-section, and few socio-
demographic or partisan differences emerged in panel attrition. Important for our purposes, the
2012 re-interview asked respondents the same gun control question contained in the 2010
CCES questionnaire. Thus using this panel, we are able to assess whether changes over time in
panel respondents’ preferences over gun control systematically correspond to the occurrence of
a mass shooting near their place of residence between panel waves.
We created a dichotomous treatment variable coded 1 if a respondent resided in a zip code
within 100 miles of a mass shooting occurring between survey waves (December 2010 to
September 2012), and 0 otherwise. There were 0 mass shootings in 2010 after the ﬁrst CCES
wave, six mass shootings in 2011, and ten in 2012 prior to the 2012 CCES re-interview (see
Appendix C for a list of these events). A total of 621 respondents in the panel lived 100 miles or
closer to one of these sixteen events. Importantly, we restrict our analysis to respondents whose
zip codes did not change between survey waves, thus helping to ensure that those coded 1 on
our treatment variable received the treatment occurring in their reported area of residence
between survey waves.
For our analysis, we estimated a static-score lagged dependent variable model, where we
regress 2012 gun control attitudes on 2010 gun control attitudes, our dichotomous treatment
variable, and the set of 2010 controls used in Table 1.80 We present the results from this analysis
in Table 3. As can be seen, even after controlling for prior attitudes – which is expectedly one of
the most powerful predictors in the model – having a mass shooting occur close by between
survey waves is associated with a signiﬁcant increase in the probability of favoring stricter gun
control laws. Indeed, post-estimation analysis of predicted probabilities indicates a 0.06 increase
in the probability of preferring stricter gun control laws as a function of having a mass shooting
occur within 100 miles of one’s place of residence between survey waves. While this effect
appears rather modest, it is quite impressive in light of the massive variance in 2012 gun control
preferences accounted for by 2010 preferences. Indeed, a minimum to maximum value change
(that is, preferring less to more strict gun control laws) in 2010 reported gun control preferences
is associated with nearly an 0.80 increase in the probability of reporting a preference for stricter
laws in 2012.
78 Ansolebehere and Schaffner 2015.
79 Ansolebehere and Schaffner 2015.
80 As noted by Margalit (2013), the estimated effect of the treatment in this speciﬁcation is identical to that
obtained from a model where the dependent variable is the difference in gun control attitudes between time (t)
and (t − 1). Indeed, the results for our treatment variable are positive and signiﬁcant when estimating a dynamic
dependent variable model (see Appendix Table B8).
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Thus we see that residing near a mass shooting between waves explains a non-negligible
amount of the variance left over after explaining 2012 attitudes with prior attitudes. We should
also note that we conducted a placebo test to assess whether our treatment inﬂuenced gun
control preferences reported pre-treatment in 2010. The results from this test are presented in
Appendix Table B9. In short, we found that while our treatment variable signiﬁcantly predicted
2012 attitudes, it had no effect on 2010 attitudes.
REPLICATION OF RESULTS
An additional concern with the results presented thus far is that they largely rely on a single
dataset and dependent variable, and thus may be an anomaly that fails to appear outside of the
TABLE 3 Local Occurrence of a Mass Shooting and Support for Gun
Control Over Time
B SE
Treatment – Local Shooting 0.231* (0.114)
Contextual Controls
Median Income −1.09 (0.427)
College Education 1.26 (0.312)
Percent Black 0.001 (0.253)
Republican Vote −0.443 (0.403)
Murders Per Capita −1.28 (0.766)
Firearm Stores Per Capita −0.231 (0.236)
Population Density 1.51 (0.872)
Total Population 0.145 (0.211)
Individual Controls
2010 Attitude 2.68** (0.052)
Education 0.278* (0.109)
Income 0.166 (0.137)
Age 0.013** (0.003)
Male −0.459** (0.061)
Black 0.678** (0.154)
Hispanic 0.161 (0.147)
Asian 0.170 (0.280)
Homeowner 0.030 (0.082)
Children −0.012 (0.077)
Military −0.694 (0.455)
Military Family 0.040 (0.096)
Party ID −0.322** (0.047)
Ideology −2.73** (0.146)
Religiosity −0.022 (0.081)
South 0.063 (0.073)
Thresholds
Cut 1 1.02 (0.274)
Cut 2 5.27 (0.281)
# of Individuals 8,371
# of Zip Codes 5,825
Note: entries are unstandardized regression coefﬁcients from a multilevel
regression model with a random intercept (zip) estimated using gllamm in the
software package Stata®. Reported signiﬁcance levels are based upon two-tailed
hypothesis tests. Source: 2010–2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Panel. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01
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2010 CCES. As a further test of the robustness of our ﬁndings, we sought to replicate our
results using a separate national sample of adult Americans, as well as a distinct dependent
variable. For this purpose, we draw on the 2010 Political Independents Survey (N = 3,500)
conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.81 This survey contained
nearly all the measures included in the CCES (except homeownership); thus we were
able to perform a very clean replication test. The dependent variable for this analysis is a
question asking respondents: ‘What do you think is more important – to protect the right of
Americans to own guns, OR to control gun ownership?’ From this item, we constructed a
dichotomous item coded (1) ‘Control gun ownership’[47.5 per cent] or (0) ‘Protect the right of
Americans to own guns’ [48.6 per cent].82 We present the results from our analysis in
Table 4 and Figure 3. For information about question wording and variable measurement, see
Appendix A.
Beginning with Table 4, the results reveal that key effects observed with the 2010 CCES
data replicate when focusing on a different measure of views on gun control, as well as an
entirely different national sample. Interestingly, when looking at Figure 3, we see that the size
of the effects of proximity to a shooting are even more dramatic in the Pew data than in the
CCES data when focusing on proximity to more than one mass shooting. Further, similar
to what was found with the CCES data, we see that the estimated size of the effect of proximity
to a mass shooting is (1) enhanced when focusing on events with more victims and (2)
attenuated when focusing on events occurring further back in time (for full results, see
Appendix Table B10). While not presented in Figure 3, there were no signiﬁcant differences in
the effect of proximity by partisanship (see Table B10), which provides additional evidence
against the Partisan-Motivated Reasoning hypothesis. These results corroborate our initial
ﬁndings and strongly suggest that our ﬁndings are not an artifact of any single dataset or
dependent variable.
CONCLUSION
Former President Obama personally addressed the nation more than a dozen times following a
major mass public shooting during his tenure in ofﬁce. What was surprisingly absent from these
speeches – at least prior to the 2012 Sandy Hook mass shooting, which appears to be a
watershed moment (at least for the Obama Administration) – was the issue of guns as a causal
factor for the rising gun violence.83
In fact, members of Congress from both political parties have been largely reticent on the
issue, reluctant to pass legislation regulating ﬁrearms for fear that they lack sufﬁcient public
support to challenge powerful gun rights’ groups. Nearing the end of his time in ofﬁce, the
former president’s attitude appears to have shifted from one of political caution to outright
indignation. Visibly frustrated by the spate of recent mass shootings, particularly the shooting at
Umqua Community College in Roseburg, Oregon, which wounded seventeen people (nine
fatally), Obama pleaded with news organizations to push the issue to the top of the agenda and
publish statistics comparing deaths in the United States from terrorist attacks to those resulting
from gun violence. Obama concluded: ‘This is a political choice that we make to allow this to
81 This data is available at the Pew Research Center (http://www.people-press.org/2010/09/23/independents-
oppose-party-in-power-again/). This survey relied upon random digit dialing and was ﬁelded between 25 August
and 6 September. The AAPOR response rate (deﬁnition 3) was 16.5 per cent for landlines, and 11 per cent for
cell phones.
82 Roughly 3.9 per cent of the sample said ‘don’t know’ or refused to answer this question.
83 E.g., see Korte 2015.
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TABLE 4 The Effect of Proximity to Mass ShootingsoOn Chosen Trade-Off Between Gun
Rights vs. Gun Control
First nearest
shooting
Two nearest
shootings
Three nearest
shootings
Proximity to Shooting 0.630*
(0.274)
Avg. Proximity 2.11* 3.09*
(0.988) (1.30)
Contextual Controls
Median Income 1.45* 1.45* 1.41*
(0.577) (0.579) (0.579)
College Education 0.185 0.187 0.209
(0.398) (0.398) (0.398)
Percent Black 0.159 0.144 0.126
(0.346) (0.347) (0.347)
Republican Vote −0.669^ −0.682^ −0.652^
(0.376) (0.377) (0.376)
Murders Per Capita −0.712 −0.708 −0.678
(0.555) (0.555) (0.553)
Gun Stores Per Capita 0.457 0.533 0.641
(1.91) (1.92) (1.92)
Population Density 4.60** 4.60** 4.52**
(1.54) (1.55) (1.54)
Total Population 0.783* 0.793* 0.797*
(0.323) (0.324) (0.323)
Shootings in State −0.006 −0.007 −0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Individual Controls
Education 0.232 0.232 0.232
(0.194) (0.194) (0.194)
Income −0.165 −0.166 −0.165
(0.172) (0.173) (0.172)
Age −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male −0.842*** −0.842*** −0.841***
(0.099) (0.100) (0.099)
Black 0.328^ 0.330^ 0.329^
(0.177) (0.177) (0.177)
Hispanic 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01***
(0.183) (0.183) (0.183)
Asian 1.11** 1.10** 1.11**
(0.374) (0.374) (0.373)
Children 0.064 0.065 0.067
(0.090) (0.090) (0.090)
Party ID −2.00*** −2.00*** −2.00***
(0.191) (0.191) (0.191)
Ideology −1.45*** −1.45*** −1.45***
(0.221) (0.221) (0.221)
Religiosity 0.383** 0.386** 0.386**
(0.148) (0.148) (0.148)
South 0.104 0.104 0.101
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113)
Constant 0.743 −0.716 −1.66
(0.387) (0.948) (1.24)
Likelihood Ratio Test 1.56 1.65 1.58
# of Individuals 3,156 3,156 3,156
# of zip codes 2,775 2,775 2,775
Note: entries are unstandardized regression coefﬁcients from multilevel logistic regression models
with random intercepts (zip) estimated using xtlogit in the software package Stata®. Reported
signiﬁcance levels are based upon two-tailed hypothesis tests. Source: September 2010 Political
Independents Survey, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. ^p< 0.10, *p< 0.05,
**p< 0.01, ***p<0.001
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happen every few months in America […] if you think this is a problem, then you should expect
your elected ofﬁcials to reﬂect your views’.84
Indeed, our ﬁndings suggest that Americans – Democrats and Republicans alike – are
responsive to tragic events like mass public shootings, albeit in a contextually dependent way.
In contrast to claims made by vocal gun rights’ advocates, we uncover evidence that citizens
living near mass public shootings are more likely to prefer gun control. One unfortunate
implication of our ﬁndings is that movement away from a permissive culture of gun rights
towards majority support for strict gun regulations may rest upon the occurrence of more mass
public shootings. To be sure, this implication places gun violence and gun control on par with
policy-feedback loops observed in many other issue domains, such as environmental regulation,
disaster preparedness and regulation of speculative trading – where the breaking of opinion
inertia and status quo policy requires exogenous shocks that inﬂict pain on the nation.
Our ﬁndings also make several important contributions to the literature, and suggest
important directions for future research. First, our research addresses a visible gap in the
scholarly literature on the effects of mass shootings on public opinion. While there is currently a
wide swath of descriptive analysis of aggregate polling data on gun legislation, there is a
surprising dearth of individual-level research on the effects of mass shootings. Secondly, we
provide empirical evidence of an important class of focusing events, characterized as intentional
criminal acts designed to inﬂict mass casualties on random members of the public. Much of the
extant public policy literature on focusing events concerns the effects of unintentional events
such as natural disasters or environmental accidents on public opinion. Thirdly, we add to the
literature on contextual effects by providing a strong empirical demonstration that Americans’
preferences over gun control are responsive to proximate instances of egregious gun violence.
This contextual ﬁnding is important in light of recent work by Hopkins,85 who uncovered
surprising non-responsiveness in Americans’ policy attitudes to various policy-relevant factors
operative in their environment. Indeed, while Hopkins ﬁnds that citizens’ policy attitudes are not
responsive to local pollution, income inequality or the presence of military bases, they are
responsive to crime, unemployment and immigrant populations – stimuli reasoned by Hopkins to
be threat laden and publicized by the mass media. Thus our ﬁndings add to these by showing an
important instance of citizens’ responsiveness to their surrounding environment. Finally, we
stipulate a potential causal mechanism through which mass shootings may operate on gun control
attitudes – namely, that these events heighten the perceived threat of gun violence, which in theory
should induce greater scrutiny of policy-relevant information, increased sensitivity to risk and
anxiety-reducing actions intended to mitigate the threat, among other things.
Future research should build upon our efforts by exploring the proposed causal mechanism
relating to threat. More speciﬁcally, scholars could test whether exposure to nearby mass
shootings heightens threat perceptions, thereby inducing anxiety. In addition, scholars could
search for behavioral data linked to the gun policy domain. Of particular interest would be
behavioral change resulting from residing near a mass shooting (akin to what scholars have
observed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks). For example, we might expect individuals living near
mass a shooting to seek out information related to the issue of gun control, discuss the issue
among members of their social network, potentially shift their partisan loyalties and possibly
contact their legislators to press for policy change (as is often the case for family members of
those injured or killed in a mass shooting). Indeed, our ﬁndings present an important but
84 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2015/10/01/statement-president-shootings-umpqua-commu-
nity-college-roseburg-oregon.
85 Hopkins 2013.
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incomplete piece of a potential policy-feedback loop, as changes to public opinion may be
insufﬁcient to stimulate policy change without opinion changes translating into political action
aimed at inﬂuencing policy. Thus an important step for future research in this area would be to
assess the implications of our ﬁndings with respect to mass political behavior, as well as to
assess whether the spatial pattern of shootings and opinion change we uncover corresponds to
potential spatial variation in changes to local gun ordinances.
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